Optimal production and pricing strategies in a dynamic model of
  monopolistic firm by Rokhlin, Dmitry B. & Mironenko, Georgii
ar
X
iv
:1
60
1.
04
26
4v
1 
 [m
ath
.O
C]
  1
7 J
an
 20
16
OPTIMAL PRODUCTION AND PRICING STRATEGIES IN A
DYNAMIC MODEL OF MONOPOLISTIC FIRM
DMITRY B. ROKHLIN AND GEORGII MIRONENKO
Abstract. We consider a deterministic continuous time model of monopolistic firm,
which chooses production and pricing strategies of a single good. Firm’s goal is to
maximize the discounted profit over infinite time horizon. The no-backlogging as-
sumption induces the state constraint on the inventory level. The revenue and pro-
duction cost functions are assumed to be continuous but, in general, we do not impose
the concavity/convexity property. Using the results form the theory of viscosity so-
lutions and Young-Fenchel duality, we derive a representation for the value function,
study its regularity properties, and give a complete description of optimal strategies
for this non-convex optimal control problem. In agreement with the results of Chazal
et al. (2003), it is optimal to liquidate initial inventory in finite time and then use
an optimal static strategy. We give a condition, allowing to distinguish if this static
strategy can be represented by an ordinary or relaxed control. The latter is related
to production cycles. General theory is illustrate by the example of a non-convex
production cost, proposed by Arvan and Moses (1981).
1. introduction
In the last decades in economical literature there was a considerable interest to the
models of firms, performing coordinated decisions on production and pricing: see the
reviews [7, 22, 5]. In such models the ability to influence the demand by dynamic
pricing may considerably change optimal inventory levels. The goal of the present
paper is to study optimal strategies of a profit maximizing firm in continuous time
deterministic setting.
Assume that a firm can produce some good at rate α ≥ 0. Let C(α) be the related
price of production. Being a monopolist, the firm can settle a price p ≥ 0 of the unit
good. The demand rate q = D(p) is known strictly decreasing function of price. An
elementary, but natural problem is to maximize the instantaneous profit flow:
R(q)− C(q)→ max
q≥0
, R(q) = qD−1(q). (1.1)
This simple model of a monopoly is well-known: see, e.g., [20, Chapter 14]. For
a positive optimal solution q̂ of (1.1) the marginal revenue R′(q̂) coincides with the
marginal production cost C ′(q̂).
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In the present paper we are interested in continuous time extension of this model.
We assume that the firm can continuously produce and sell a single good. Firm’s goal
is to maximize the discounted profit over the infinite time horizon. The backlogging
is not allowed: that is, the inventory level should be non-negative. A preliminary
formulation of the correspondent optimal control problem is the following:∫ ∞
0
e−βt(R(qt)− C(αt)) dt→ max, (1.2)
X˙t = αt − qt, X0 = x ≥ 0; Xt ≥ 0, t ≥ 0. (1.3)
Let us call this problem convex if R is concave and C is convex.
In contrast to existing literature, we do not introduce any storage cost. The reason
lies in the nature of optimal strategies: even without such costs an optimal inventory
path is monotonically decreasing, reaches zero in finite time and stands forever at this
level. In fact, the firm needs no warehouse. It is appropriate to make a reservation that
for a non-convex production cost C it may be necessary to use relaxed (or randomized)
production strategies to retain the inventory X at zero level and meet an optimal
demand. In practice, instead of the relaxed control, one may use approximately optimal
strategies, corresponding to production cycles, where the inventory oscillates near 0.
So, there is a need in a “small” warehouse.
First continuous time production/pricing model of the same sort as (1.2), (1.3) was
proposed in [14]. The horizon in [14] is finite and the demand curve is linear (and
depends on time). In 1980-s this line of research was continued in [19, 8, 6]. The focus
of [19, 6] was also the finite horizon case, and even a discounting was not introduced.
In [8] the case of infinite horizon was addressed, but instead of the state constraint
Xt ≥ 0 the authors consider a penalty function. Prior to [8], an infinite horizon model
was considered in [1, 2]. Although the papers [1, 2] are not mathematically rigorous,
they contain interesting economical insights. In particular, the authors emphasized
that if the production cost is non-convex, then the ability to store the product may
result in the dominance of a cyclic production strategy over a static one. The example
of [2] is analyzed below.
The paper, which is most closely related to ours, is [4]. Although the model of
[4] contains a strictly positive storage cost and is related to the finite horizon case,
the several key conclusions remain valid for our model. Under the assumption that
the problem is convex, it was proved that an optimal strategy typically consists of
three stages: (i) a redundant inventory is selling, (ii) production is switched on, but
sales prevail and the inventory still decreases, (iii) the stock is cleared, the intensities
of production and selling are equal and maximize the instantaneous profit (1.1). It
was also emphasized that an accumulation of inventory is not optimal, while optimal
production and price paths are non-decreasing.
In concluding remarks of [4] it is suggested to consider non-convex production cost
functions to explain the phenomenon of inventory accumulation. In fact, this is exactly
the subject of the present paper. Our conclusions are somewhat mixed: in conjunc-
tion with discounting the non-convexities can explain production cycles, but not the
inventory accumulation.
OPTIMAL PRODUCTION AND PRICING STRATEGIES 3
Another motivation of the present study is the empirical evidence that it is not
uncommon for firms to “operate in a region of declining marginal costs” (see [15]). It
is mentioned in [15] that the non-convexities in production costs can explain “volatility
of production relative to sales”. The well-know idea is simple. Assume, e.g., that there
are three possible production rates: α ∈ {0, 1, 2} with production costs C(0) = 0,
C(1) = 1, C(2) = 3/2. Note that C, extended by C(x) = +∞, x 6∈ {1, 2, 3}, is not
convex. We see that to produce two units of good in two units of time, it is better to
produce with rate α = 2 in the first time interval and nothing in the second one, than to
produce one unit in each time interval. If the demand intensity equals to one unit, the
firm needs some storage. In the dynamic model under consideration an approximately
optimal strategy of similar nature will appear below.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we derive a representation of the
value function and study its regularity properties (Theorem 1). It is proved that the
value function v is continuously differentiable and strictly concave, even if the problem
is not convex. Me mention that passing to the concave (resp., convex) hull of R (resp.,
C) does not change the Hamiltonian and, hence, the value function. The same value
function corresponds to the problem with relaxed controls (Theorem 2).
The case of zero initial inventory is considered in Section 3. For a convex problem
optimality of a static strategy αt = qt = û, where û maximizes the instantaneous profit
(1.1), was proved in [4]. In Theorem 3 we give a necessary and sufficient condition for
optimality of this strategy in general case. To give an economical interpretation of this
condition, we divide the firm into production and sales departments. A static strategy
û is optimal iff there exists a “shadow price” η such that the intensity û is optimal for
both departments, trading the good at this price. The least shadow price is identified
with the least minimum point of the Hamiltonian and with the marginal indirect utility
v′(0) of zero inventory. Certainly, the mentioned condition is satisfied for the convex
problem (Theorem 4). If this condition is violated, we construct an optimal relaxed
strategy (Theorem 5) and an approximately optimal ordinary strategy, which induces
cyclic inventory behavior.
In Section 4 we present a complete description of optimal strategies for positive
initial inventory x > 0 (Theorem 6). The are two major stages. At the first stage
the inventory is strictly decreasing and reaches zero. The duration of this stage τ is
finite and is explicitly calculated. It depends only on the relative values v′(0), v′(x)
of the marginal indirect utility v and the discounting factor β. At the second stage
the inventory is retained at zero level either by relaxed or by ordinary production
and selling strategies, considered in Section 3. It is worth mentioning that it may be
necessary to involve relaxed controls only at the second stage.
In Section 5 we consider a simple example of convex problem with a linear production
cost C(α) = cα, α ∈ [0, α]. The production process should start before the stock is
cleared if and only if the price c of production of the unit good is smaller than the least
shadow price ζ .
In Section 6 we consider the example of [1], where the demand D is linear, while
the production cost C is concave for small values of α and convex for large ones. In
agreement with [1, 2] there are three main cases. (i) The firm does not exist. That
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is, it is optimal simply to sell an initial inventory. The production stage never starts.
(ii) The purely selling stage is followed by production cycles (or relaxed production
strategy). (iii) The production starts before the stock is cleared, and an ordinary
static strategy is optimal when the stock is cleared. As compared to [1], we specify the
exact parameter values, corresponding to these cases.
2. Representation of the value function
Suppose that a firm can produce some good at rate αt ∈ A, where A is a closed subset
of R+ = [0,∞). Being a monopolist, the firm can settle a price pt ≥ 0 of the unit good.
Under the assumption that the demand rate is some known strictly decreasing function
of price: q = D(p), it is more convenient to think that the firm chooses dynamically
the demand rate qt ∈ Q. The set Q ⊂ R+ is assumed to be compact set. The inventory
level X satisfies the equation
Xt = x+
∫ t
0
(αt − qt) dt, t ≥ 0. (2.1)
Suppose that the backlogging is not allowed: Xt ≥ 0, and the sets Q, A satisfy the
following conditions:
0 ∈ A ∩Q, A\{0} 6= ∅, Q\{0} 6= ∅. (2.2)
The solution of (2.1) will also be denoted by Xx,α,q.
Let R(q) = qp = qD−1(q) be the instantaneous revenue, and C(α) the instantaneous
production cost. Firm’s goal is to maximize the discounted profit over the infinite time
horizon: ∫ ∞
0
e−βt(R(qt)− C(αt)) dt, β > 0.
We assume that R : Q 7→ R+ is continuous, R(0) = 0, and C : A 7→ R+ is a non-
decreasing continuous function. If A is unbounded, then we additionally assume that
C is 1-coercive:
C(α)/α→ +∞, A ∋ α→ +∞. (2.3)
Denote by A (x) the set of Borel measurable functions α : R+ → A, q : R+ → Q
such that the inventory level (2.1) in non-negative. The value function v is defined by
v(x) = sup
(α,q)∈A (x)
∫ ∞
0
e−βt(R(qt)− C(αt)) dt, x ≥ 0. (2.4)
Let us introduce the Hamiltonian
H(z) = R̂(z) + Ĉ(z), R̂(z) = sup
q∈Q
{R(q)− qz}, Ĉ(z) = sup
α∈A
{αz − C(α)}. (2.5)
Note, that the functions R̂, Ĉ are convex and finite on R. Hence, they are also contin-
uous. Recall (see [18]) that a bounded uniformly continuous function u : R+ 7→ R is
called a constrained viscosity solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation
βu(x)−H(u′(x)) = 0, x ≥ 0, (2.6)
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if for any x > 0 (resp., x ≥ 0) and any test function ϕ ∈ C2(R+) such that x is a
minimum (resp., maximum) point of u− ϕ on (0,∞) (resp., on [0,∞)), the inequality
βu(x)−H(ϕ′(x)) ≥ 0 (resp., ≤ 0)
holds true. Note, that [18] considers a minimization problem, and the definition above
is modified accordingly. Using the terminology of viscosity solutions, one may rephrase
this definition by saying that u is a viscosity supersolution of (2.6) on (0,∞) and a
viscosity subsolution on [0,∞).
It is easy to see that a function u ∈ C1(R+) is a constrained viscosity solution of
(2.6) if and only if
βu(x) = H(u′(x)), x > 0, (2.7)
βu(0) ≤ H(z), z ≥ u′(0). (2.8)
By u′(0) we mean the right derivative. To get the last inequality consider a test function
ϕ with ϕ(0) = u(0), ϕ′(0) = z > u′(0).
The results, collected in the next lemma, were proved in [18] (Theorems 3.3, 2.1,
2.2).
Lemma 1. Assume that A is compact. Then the value function v is bounded and
uniformly continuous. Moreover, v is the unique constrained viscosity solution of the
HJB equation (2.6) in the class of bounded uniformly continuous functions.
Note that the assumption (A3) of [18], concerning the existence of an ”inward point-
ing direction”, is satisfied, since sup{α − q : α ∈ A, q ∈ Q} > 0, as follows from
(2.2).
Denote by MH = argminz∈RH(z) the set of minimum points of H .
Lemma 2. The set MH ⊂ R+ is non-empty, closed and convex.
Proof. The set MH is closed and convex by the continuity and convexity of H . For
z < 0 we have
R̂(z) > R̂(0), Ĉ(z) = −C(0) = Ĉ(0),
since R is non-negative, R(0) = 0, and C is non-decreasing. Thus H , restricted to
(−∞, 0], attains its strict global minimum at z = 0. For z > 0 we have
R̂(z) ≥ R(0), Ĉ(z) ≥ αz − C(α)
for any α > 0, α ∈ A. Thus, H(z) → +∞, z → +∞. It follows that ∅ 6= MH ⊂
R+. 
Let I be an interval (that is, a convex set) in R. Recall that a function ψ : I 7→ R,
is called absolutely continuous if for any ε > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that
k∑
i=1
|ψ(bi)− ψ(ai)| < ε
for any disjoint intervals (ai, bi), i = 1, . . . , k with [ai, bi] ⊂ I and
∑k
i=1(bi − ai) < δ.
The set of absolutely continuous functions is denoted by AC(I). A function ψ : I 7→ R
is called locally absolutely continuous if ψ ∈ AC([a, b]) for any [a, b] ⊂ I. Any locally
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absolutely continuous function ψ is a.e. differentiable and can be recovered from its
derivative by the Lebesgue interval (see, e.g., [11, Theorem 3.30]):
ψ(x) = ψ(x) +
∫ x
x
ψ′(y) dy, x, x ∈ I.
Writing “a.e.” we always mean ”almost everywhere with respect to the Lebesgue
measure”.
We will use the following well known result (see [13] (Chapter IX, Exercise 13) or
[21, Theorem 2]):
Lemma 3. Let ψ : [a, b] 7→ R be continuous and strictly monotonic. Then ψ−1 is
absolutely continuous if and only if ψ′ 6= 0 a.e. on (a, b).
Denote by ζ = minMH ≥ 0 the least minimum point of H .
Theorem 1. The value function v is bounded:
v(x) ≤ H(0)
β
= lim
y→∞
v(y)
and admits the following representation:
(i) if ζ = 0, then
v(x) = H(0)/β, (2.9)
(ii) if ζ > 0 then
v(x) =
H(ξ(x))
β
=
H(ζ)
β
+
∫ x
0
ξ(y) dy, (2.10)
where ξ(x) is defined by the equation
x = Ψ(ξ) := −
∫ ζ
ξ
H ′(z)
βz
dz, ξ ∈ (0, ζ ], x ≥ 0.
In case (ii) v is strictly increasing and strictly concave. Moreover, v′ is absolutely
continuous and satisfies the conditions v′(0) = ζ, limx→∞ v
′(x) = 0. Finally, v′′ < 0
a.e.
Proof. First we check that (2.9), (2.10) are constrained viscosity solutions of (2.6). If
ζ = 0, then (2.9) satisfies (2.7), (2.8). Hence, (2.9) is a constrained viscosity solution
of (2.6).
Assume that ζ > 0. Since H is convex, its derivative H ′ exists on a set G = (0, ζ)\D,
where D is at most countable, and H ′ is non-decreasing on G: see [16] (Theorem 25.3).
Furthermore, H ′(x) ≤ 0, x ∈ G since H is decreasing on (0, ζ). If H ′(x) = 0 for some
x ∈ G then x < ζ is a minimum point of H . Hence, H ′(x) < 0, x ∈ G.
Consider the following continuous strictly decreasing function
Ψ(ξ) = −
∫ ζ
ξ
H ′(z)
βz
dz, ξ ∈ (0, ζ ].
We have Ψ(ζ) = 0,
Ψ(0+) = − lim
ξց0
∫ ζ
ξ
H ′(s)
βs
ds = +∞,
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since H ′ is a.e. bounded from above by a negative constant in a right neighborhood of
0. It follows that the formula
x = Ψ(ξ)
correctly defines the inverse function ξ = Ψ−1 : R+ 7→ (0, ζ ], which is strictly decreasing
and continuous.
Moreover, since Ψ′(ξ) < 0 a.e. on (0, ζ), the function ξ(x) = Ψ−1(x) is locally
absolutely continuous on R+ by Lemma 3. But since ξ is monotone and bounded, it
follows that ξ ∈ AC(R+). By Lemma 3 we also conclude that ξ′(x) < 0 a.e. on (0,∞),
since Ψ = ξ−1 is locally absolutely continuous on (0, ζ ].
Furthermore, by Corollary 3.50 of [11] we can apply the chain rule:
1 =
d
dx
Ψ(ξ(x)) =
H ′(ξ(x))
βξ(x)
ξ′(x) a.e. on (0,∞). (2.11)
The function H(ξ) is absolutely continuous as a superposition of an absolutely con-
tinuous function ξ an a Lipschitz continuous function H (recall that H is convex).
Hence,
H(ξ(x)) = H(ζ) +
∫ x
0
d
dy
H(ξ(y)) dy.
By the chain rule and formula (2.11), we get
H(ξ(x)) = H(ζ) +
∫ x
0
ξ′(y)H ′(ξ(y)) dy = H(ζ) + β
∫ x
0
ξ(y) dy.
Now it is easy to see that
u(x) =
H(ζ)
β
+
∫ x
0
ξ(y) dy =
H(ξ(x))
β
is a constrained viscosity solution of (2.6). Indeed, u′(x) = ξ(x), x > 0 and
βu(x)−H(u′(x)) = βu(x)−H(ξ(x)) = 0, x > 0.
The boundary condition (2.8) is satisfied by the definition of ζ :
βu(0) = H(ζ) ≤ H(z) for all z.
Note, that u is strictly increasing since u′ = ξ > 0, and is strictly concave, since ξ is
strictly decreasing (see [10], Chapter B, Theorem 4.1.4). Furthermore, if ζ > 0 then
u(x) ≤ lim
y→∞
u(y) = lim
y→∞
H(ξ(y))
β
=
H(0)
β
.
Other properties of the derivatives of (2.10), mentioned in the statement of Theorem
1, are evident from the construction of ξ.
We have proved that formulas (2.9), (2.10) define a constrained viscosity solution of
(2.6). If A is compact, then (2.9), (2.10) is the value function (2.4) by the uniqueness
result, stated in Lemma 1.
In general case put Ac = A ∩ [0, c], and denote by Hc, vc the correspondent Hamil-
tonian and value function. For z ≤ 0 we have Hc(z) = H(z) = −C(0). Let
α̂(z) ∈ argmax
a∈A
{zα − C(α)}, z > 0.
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If α̂(z) > 0, then the inequality
−C(0) ≤ α̂(z)
(
z − C(α̂(z))
α̂(z)
)
and the coercivity condition (2.3) imply that α̂(z), z ∈ [0, z] is bounded from above
for any fixed z > 0. Thus, for any z > 0 there exists c > 0 such that
sup
a∈A
{zα − C(α)} = sup
a∈Ac
{zα − C(α)}
and Hc(z) = H(z) for |z| ≤ z, c ≥ c. Taking z > ζ , from the convexity of H we
conclude that ζ is the least minimum point of Hc for c large enough.
Since the expressions (2.9), (2.10) depend only on the values of the Hamiltonian
on [0, ζ ], it follows that they define a constrained viscosity solution of (2.6) with the
Hamiltonians H and Hc for c ≥ c. But, by Lemma 1, vc is the unique constrained
viscosity solution of (2.6) with the Hamiltonians Hc. It follows that the functions
(2.9), (2.10) coincide with vc, c ≥ c.
Clearly, vc ≤ v. It remains to prove the reverse inequality. For any admissible
strategy (α, q) ∈ A (x) we have
d
dt
(e−βtvc(Xt)) = e
−βt(−βvc(Xt) + (αt − qt)v′c(Xt)) a.e., (2.12)
where X is defined by (2.1). From the HJB equation (2.7) we get
βvc(Xt) ≥ R(qt)− qtv′c(Xt) + αtv′c(Xt)− C(αt) a.e. (2.13)
Note, that the equality (2.7) is satisfied for x = 0 by the continuity property. From
(2.12), (2.13) we obtain the inequality
− d
dt
(e−βtvc(Xt)) ≥ e−βt(R(qt)− C(αt)) a.e.
It follows that
vc(x)− e−βTvc(XT ) ≥
∫ T
0
e−βt(R(qt)− C(αt)) dt
for any T > 0. Since vc is bounded, we conclude that
vc(x) ≥
∫ ∞
0
e−βt(R(qt)− C(αt)), (α, q) ∈ A (x).
Thus, vc ≥ v. 
In the course of the proof we have showed that passing from the set A to A ∩ [0, c]
does not affect the value function v for c large enough.
Note also that if ζ > 0, then the optimal discounted gain is always lower than
H(0)/β. If ζ = 0, the discounted gain H(0)/β can be obtained with zero initial
inventory. Moreover, any initial inventory x > 0 is useless.
For a function f : R 7→ (−∞,+∞] denote by f ∗ : R 7→ (−∞,+∞] its Young-Fenchel
transform:
f ∗(z) = sup
x∈R
{zx − f(x)},
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and by co f the convex hull:
(co f)(x) = inf{δf(x1) + (1− δ)f(x2) : δ ∈ [0, 1], xi ∈ dom f, δx1 + (1− δ)x2 = x},
where dom f = {x : f(x) < ∞}. For G ⊂ R denote by coG the intersection of all in-
tervals, containing G. The following result can be found in [9] (Chapter X, Proposition
1.5.4).
Lemma 4. Let G ⊂ R be a nonempty closed set and f : G 7→ R a continuous function.
Put f(x) = +∞, x 6∈ G and assume that f is 1-coercive: f(x)/|x| → +∞, |x| → ∞.
Then
co f = f ∗∗, dom (co f) = coG,
and for any x ∈ coG there exist x1, x2 ∈ G and δ ∈ (0, 1) such that
x = δx1 + (1− δ)x2, (co f)(x) = δf(x1) + (1− δ)f(x2). (2.14)
The functions C, −R satisfy the conditions of Lemma 4. Put C(α) = +∞, α 6∈ A
and R(q) = −∞, q 6∈ Q. To unify the notation, denote by
C˜ = C∗∗ = coC, R˜ = −(−R)∗∗ = −co (−R)
the closed convex (resp., concave) hull of C (resp., of R).
Comparing with the previous notation:
Ĉ(z) = C∗(z) = sup
x∈R
{xz − C(x)} = C∗∗∗(z) = sup
x∈R
{xz − C˜(x)},
R̂(z) = sup
x∈R
{R(x)− xz} = sup
x∈R
{x · (−z)− (−R(x))} = (−R)∗(−z)
= (−R)∗∗∗(−z) = sup
x∈R
(x · (−z) − (−R)∗∗(x)} = sup
x∈R
{R˜(x)− xz}, (2.15)
we conclude that the Hamiltonian (2.5) can be represented as follows:
H(z) = C∗(z) + (−R)∗(−z) = sup
x∈R
{xz − C˜(x)}+ sup
x∈R
{R˜(x)− xz}. (2.16)
Let us introduce the convexified problem:
v˜(x) = sup
(α,q)∈A˜ (x)
∫ ∞
0
e−βt(R˜(qt)− C˜(αt)) dt, (2.17)
where A˜ (x) is the set of Borel measurable functions α : R+ 7→ coA, q : R+ 7→ coQ
such that Xx,α,qt ≥ 0. Note, that C˜ still satisfies condition (2.3): see [10, Chapter E,
Proposition 1.3.9(ii)]. Clearly, v ≤ v˜. But, since the Hamiltonian for the convexified
problem is the same as for the original one (see (2.16)), by Theorem 1 we have v˜ = v.
Let us extend the classes of production and pricing strategies. The relaxed controls
qt(dy) and αt(dy) are the mappings from [0,∞) to the sets of probability measures on
Q and A such that the functions
t 7→
∫
Q
ϕ(y) qt(dy), t 7→
∫
A
ϕ(y)αt(dy)
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are Borel measurable for any continuous function ϕ. The inventory dynamics under
relaxed controls is given by
Xt = x+
∫ t
0
y qt(dy)−
∫ t
0
y αt(dy).
The class Ar(x) of admissible relaxed controls contains those which keep Xt non-
negative. The related value function is defined by
vr(x) = sup
(α,q)∈Ar(x)
(∫ ∞
0
e−βt
∫
Q
R(y) qt(dy)dt−
∫ ∞
0
e−βt
∫
A
C(y)αt(dy)dt
)
. (2.18)
We call (2.18) the relaxed problem.
Note, that any admissible relaxed strategy (αt(dx), qt(dx)) induces an admissible
ordinary strategy (∫
A
xαs(dx),
∫
Q
x qs(dx)
)
∈ (coA, coQ)
for the convexified problem (2.17). Hence, the Jensen inequality implies that∫ ∞
0
e−βt
(∫
Q
R(x) qs(dx)−
∫
A
C(x)αs(dx)
)
ds
≤
∫ ∞
0
e−βt
(
R
(∫
Q
x qs(dx)
)
− C
(∫
A
xαs(dx)
))
ds ≤ v˜(x),
since C˜ ≤ C, R˜ ≥ R. Thus, vr ≤ v˜, and an evident inequality v ≤ vr implies the
following result.
Theorem 2. The value functions (2.4), (2.17), (2.18) related to original, convexified
and relaxed problems coincide: v = vr = v˜.
The equality v = vr for a state constrained problem in the case of compact state and
control sets was proved in [12].
3. Optimal strategies for zero initial inventory
In this section we consider the case of zero initial inventory: X0 = 0. For any
constant û ∈ Q∩A, the static strategy αt = qt = û is admissible. If it is optimal, then
û ∈ M := arg max
u∈Q∩A
{R(u)− C(u)}. (3.1)
For η ∈ R put
MR(η) = argmax
q∈Q
{R(q)− ηq}, MC(η) = argmax
α∈A
{αη − C(α)},
and Mη = MR(η) ∩MC(η). Recall that ζ is the least minimum point of H .
Theorem 3. The following conditions are equivalent.
(i) A static strategy αt = qt = û ∈ M is optimal.
(ii) Mη 6= ∅ for some η ∈ R.
(iii) Mζ 6= ∅.
If Mη 6= ∅, then η is a minimum point of H and Mη = M .
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Proof. By Theorem 1 we have
βv(0) = H(ζ) ≤ H(η) = sup
q∈Q
{R(q)− ηq}+ sup
α∈A
{αη − C(α)}, η ∈ R. (3.2)
(ii) =⇒ (i). For any û ∈ Mη from (3.2) we get
v(0) ≤ (R(û)− C(û))/β =
∫ ∞
0
e−βt(R(û)− C(û)) dt. (3.3)
Thus, αt = qt = û is an optimal strategy and û ∈ M .
(i) =⇒ (iii). If a static strategy αt = qt = û is optimal, then
R(û)− C(û) = β
∫ ∞
0
e−βt(R(û)− C(û)) dt = βv(0) = H(ζ).
If û 6∈ Mζ, then we get a contradiction:
H(ζ) = R̂(ζ) + Ĉ(ζ) > R(û)− ζû+ ζû− C(û) = R(û)− C(û).
(iii) =⇒ (ii) is evident.
Let Mη 6= ∅. Note, that for û ∈ Mη we have H(η) = R(û) − C(û). It follows that
the inequality in (3.2) cannot be strict, since it would imply a strict inequality in (3.3).
Thus, if Mη 6= ∅, then H(η) = H(ζ), and η is a minimum point of H .
Let u ∈ Mη. Then
R(u)− ηu ≤ R(u)− ηu, ηu− C(u) ≤ ηu− C(u) (3.4)
for any u ∈ Q ∩A. After summation we get
R(u)− C(u) ≤ R(u)− C(u).
Hence, u ∈ M .
Now take some u ∈ M . If u 6∈ Mη, then at least one of the inequalities (3.1) is strict
and after summation we get a contradiction with the definition of u:
R(u)− C(u) < R(u)− C(u).
Thus, both inequalities (3.4) are, in fact, equalities and u ∈Mη along with u. 
To give an economical interpretation of the condition Mη 6= ∅, assume that the
firm consists of independent production and sales departments. The production de-
partment sales the good to the sales department at some shadow price η and gets the
instantaneous revenue ηα−C(α). The sales department get the instantaneous revenue
R(q)−ηq by selling the good at the market. For each possible price η the departments
try to choose optimal strategies α̂, q̂. An equilibrium α̂ = q̂ corresponds to a shadow
price η with Mη 6= ∅. By Theorem 2 a static strategy is optimal exactly when such
equilibrium exists.
Similarly to an equilibrium of a mechanical system, an equilibrium shadow price η
can be found as a minimum point of the Hamiltonian H . By Theorem 1, the least
shadow price ζ coincides with the marginal indirect utility v′(0) of zero inventory.
For a function f : R 7→ (−∞,+∞] denote by ∂f its subdifferential at a point z:
∂f(z) = {γ ∈ R : f(x) ≥ f(z) + γ(x− z), x ∈ R}.
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For any lower semicontinuous convex function f 6≡ +∞ we have (see [16, Theorem
23.5] or [17, Proposition 11.3])
argmax
x∈R
{zx − f(x)} = ∂f ∗(z). (3.5)
Theorem 4. Assume that the sets Q, A are convex, the function R is concave and the
function C is convex. Then for any η ∈ MH we have Mη 6= ∅. Hence, a stationary
strategy is optimal.
Proof. From the definition of R, C it follows that each set MR(η), MC(η) is nonempty
for any η. If g(x) = f(−x), then ∂g(x) = −∂f(−x). Using the Moreau-Rockafellar
formula (see [16, Theorem 23.8] or [3, Theorem 3.6.3]), from (2.16) we get
0 ∈ ∂H(η) = ∂C∗(η)− ∂(−R)∗(−η) = {x− y : x ∈ ∂C∗(η), y ∈ ∂(−R)∗(−η)} (3.6)
at a minimum point η of H . Furthermore, by (3.5) we have,
∂(−R)∗(−η) = argmax
x∈R
{−xη − (−R(x))} = argmax
x∈R
{R(x)− ηx} = MR(η),
∂C∗(η) = argmax
x∈R
{xη − C(x)} = MC(η).
Hence, the relation (3.6) is equivalent to the condition 0 ∈ MC(η) − MR(η), and
Mη = MC(η) ∩MR(η) 6= ∅. 
For a convex problem, considered in Theorem 4, optimality of a stationary strategy
in a more direct way was proved in [4] (Proposition 1).
To give a simple illustration of this result consider the case of constant production
cost: C(α) = c > 0, α ∈ [0, α]. It seems reasonable that only maximal production
intensity αt = α is optimal, since it gives an additional product for free, as comparing
to any other production strategy. Let Q = [0, q], q > 0. A static strategy, maximizing
the instantaneous profit flow, is the same as a strategy q̂, maximizing the concave
revenue function R(q) on [0, q ∧ α], where q ∧ α = min{q, α}. Clearly, q̂ < α, if q < α.
However, Theorem 3 asserts that α̂ = q̂ are optimal.
The explanation of this “paradox” is in the fact that an optimal selling rate q̂ is cov-
ered by any production rate α ≥ q̂. An additional product, produced by the maximal
production rate α, is not sold by an optimal strategy q̂ and remains useless.
For a non-convex problem it is possible that Mζ = ∅ and there is no optimal sta-
tionary strategy of the form (3.1). A concrete example will be given in Section 6. Our
next goal is the description of optimal strategies in this case.
By Theorems 3, 4 for the convexified problem (2.17) a stationary strategy α˜t = q˜t =
u˜,
u˜ ∈ argmax{R˜(u)− C˜(u) : u ∈ coQ ∩ coA}, (3.7)
is optimal for zero initial inventory, and
v˜(0) =
R˜(u˜)− C˜(u˜)
β
.
Furthermore, by Lemma 4 there exists γ ∈ (0, 1), ν ∈ (0, 1), qi ∈ Q, αi ∈ A, i = 1, 2
such that
u˜ = γq1 + (1− γ)q2 = να1 + (1− ν)α2, (3.8)
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R˜(u˜) = γR(q1) + (1− γ)R(q2), C˜(u˜) = νC(α1) + (1− ν)C(α2). (3.9)
Consider the relaxed controls
qt(dx) = γδq1(dx) + (1− γ)δq2(dx), αt(dx) = νδα1(dx) + (1− ν)δα2(dx), (3.10)
where δa is the Dirac measure, concentrated at a. They are admissible for the relaxed
problem (2.18), since∫ t
0
∫
Q
xqs(dx) dt−
∫ t
0
∫
A
xαs(dx) dt = t(γq
1 + (1− γ)q2 − να1 − (1− ν)α2) = 0.
By virtue of Theorem 2, the following simple calculation shows that the strategy (3.10)
is optimal:
vr(0) ≥
∫ ∞
0
e−βt
(∫
Q
R(x) qs(dx)−
∫
A
C(x)αs(dx)
)
ds
=
∫ ∞
0
e−βt
(
R˜(u˜)− C˜(u˜)
)
ds = v˜(0).
Thus, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 5. (i) Let C˜, R˜ be convex and concave hulls of C, R. Then u˜, defined by
(3.7), is an optimal static strategy for the convexified problem (2.17) with zero initial
inventory.
(ii) There exist qi ∈ Q, αi ∈ A, i = 1, 2 and γ ∈ (0, 1), ν ∈ (0, 1) such that (3.8),
(3.9) holds true. The relaxed static strategy (3.10) gives the solution of the problem
(2.18) with zero initial inventory.
The strategy (3.10) distributes the price (resp., production rate) between two levels,
which are determined by the value of û, calculated for the convexified problem, and
the location of R (resp., C) relative to its concave (resp., convex) hull.
The randomization of production and pricing strategies, assuming by relaxed con-
trols, can hardly be realized in practice. So, it makes sense to construct an ordinary
approximately optimal strategy (αε, qε) ∈ A (0). We will use the following elaboration
of Lemma 4: see [9] (Chapter X, Theorems 1.5.5, 1.5.6).
Lemma 5. Suppose that the assumptions of Lemma 4 are satisfied. If for given x ∈
coG the points x1, x2 in (2.14) are different, then co f is affine on (x1, x2) and, in
addition to (2.14), the equalities
(co f)(xi) = f(xi), sx− (co f)(x) = sxi − f(xi), s ∈ ∂(co f)(x), i = 1, 2
hold true.
For u˜, defined by (3.7), by Theorems 3, 4 we have
u˜ ∈ arg max
q∈coQ
{R˜(q)− qζ}, u˜ ∈ arg max
α∈coA
{αζ − C˜(α)}.
It follows that ζ ∈ ∂C˜(u˜) and, by Lemma 5, there exist ν ∈ (0, 1), αi ∈ A, i = 1, 2,
satisfying (3.8) such that
αiζ − C(αi) = u˜ζ − C˜(u˜), i = 1, 2. (3.11)
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Similarly, there exist γ ∈ (0, 1), qi ∈ Q, i = 1, 2, satisfying (3.8) such that
R(qi)− qiζ = R˜(u˜)− u˜ζ, i = 1, 2. (3.12)
From (3.11), (3.12) for any κ ∈ [0, 1] we get
R˜(u˜)− C˜(u˜) = κ(R(q1)− C(α2)) + (1− κ)(R(q2)− C(α1))
+ (κ(α2 − q1) + (1− κ)(α1 − q2))ζ. (3.13)
We can assume that α2 ≥ α1, q2 ≥ q1 and either α2 > α1 or q2 > q1, since otherwise
α1 = α2 = q1 = q2 = u˜, and the ordinary stationary strategy αt = qt = u˜ is optimal.
Put τi = εi, i ∈ Z+ = {0, 1, . . . } and
αεt =
∞∑
i=0
(
α2I[τi,τi+κε)(t) + α
1I[τi+κε,τi+1)(t)
)
, (3.14)
qεt =
∞∑
i=0
(
q1I[τi,τi+κε)(t) + q
2I[τi+κε,τi+1)(t)
)
, (3.15)
κ =
q2 − α1
q2 − α1 + α2 − q1 ∈ (0, 1).
The function
∫ t
τi
(αεs−qεs) ds is increasing on [τi, τi+κε) and decreasing on [τi+κε, τi+1).
It is non-negative on [τi, τi+1], since∫ τi+1
τi
(αεs − qεs) ds = κε(α2 − q1) + (1− κ)ε(α1 − q2) = 0
by the definition of κ. We see that (αε, qε) ∈ A (0).
Furthermore,∫ τi+1
τi
(R(qεt )− C(αεt )) dt =
R(q1)− C(α2)
β
(
e−βτi − e−β(τi+κε))
+
R(q2)− C(α1)
β
(
e−β(τi+κε) − e−βτi+1) .
Summing up these expressions, we get
lim
ε→0
∫ ∞
0
e−βt(R(qεt )− C(αεt )) dt = lim
ε→0
1
1− e−βε
(
R(q1)− C(α2)
β
(
1− e−βκε)
+
R(q2)− C(α1)
β
(
e−βκε − e−βε))
=
R(q1)− C(α2)
β
κ +
R(q2)− C(α1)
β
(1− κ) = R˜(u˜)− C˜(u˜)
β
= v˜(0),
where we used (3.13) in the next to last equality.
We see that the strategy (3.14), (3.15) is approximately optimal:
v(0) = lim
ε→0
∫ ∞
0
e−βt(R(qεt )− C(αεt )) dt.
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Note also, that under this strategy the inventory level Xt demonstrates cyclic behavior
and 0 ≤ Xt ≤ κ(α2 − q1)ε.
4. Optimal strategies for positive initial inventory
A complete description of optimal strategies are given in Theorem 6 below. In its
proof we use the following result.
Lemma 6. Let f satisfy the assumptions of Lemma 4, and let F be a co-countable set,
where the function f ∗ is differentiable. In view of (3.5) put
{x̂(z)} = {(f ∗)′(z)} = argmax
x∈R
{xz − co f(x)}, z ∈ F.
Then
x̂(z) ∈ dom f, co f(x̂(z)) = f(x̂(z)) (4.1)
for z ∈ F .
Proof. If (4.1) is not true, then from Lemma 5 it follows that co f is affine in a neigh-
bourhood of x̂(z). Hence, the set argmaxx∈R{xz − co f(x)} contains this neighbour-
hood, and z 6∈ F . 
If ζ = 0, then, by Theorem 1, v is constant. This case is somewhat trivial, since
an optimal strategy for zero initial inventory X0 = 0 retains this property for X0 > 0.
Thus, we will assume that ζ > 0.
The convex functions R̂, Ĉ are differentiable on a co-countable subset F of (0, ζ).
Hence, by (3.5) we conclude that each of the sets
M˜R(z) = arg max
q∈coQ
{R˜(q)− qz}, M˜C(z) = arg max
α∈coA
{αz − C˜(α)}
contains exactly one point:
M˜R(z) = arg max
q∈coQ
(R˜(q)− zq} = argmax
x∈R
(−zx − (−R˜(x)) = ∂(−R˜)∗(−z)
= −∂R̂(z) = {−R̂′(z)}, (4.2)
M˜C(z) = arg max
α∈coA
(zα− C˜(α)} = ∂C∗(z) = {Ĉ ′(z)}
for z ∈ F . In (4.2) we used the equality R̂(z) = (−R)∗(−z) = (−R˜)∗(−z): see (2.15).
Theorem 6. Let F ⊂ (0, ζ) be a co-countable set, where the convex functions R̂, Ĉ
are differentiable. Put
{q̂(z)} = arg max
q∈coQ
{R˜(q)− qz}, {α̂(z)} = arg max
α∈coA
{αz − C˜(α)}, z ∈ F,
û ∈ argmax(R˜(u)− C˜(u) : u ∈ coQ ∩ coA).
For given initial inventory x > 0 put
τ =
1
β
ln
v′(0)
v′(x)
and define X by the equation
v′(Xt) = v
′(x)eβt, t ∈ [0, τ ]. (4.3)
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Furthermore, put T = {t ∈ [0, τ ] : v′(Xt) ∈ F} and consider the strategy
α∗t = α̂(v
′(Xt)), q
∗
t = q̂(v
′(Xt)), t ∈ T , (4.4)
α∗t = q
∗
t = û, t > τ. (4.5)
On the countable set [0, τ ]\T the values α∗t , q∗t can be defined in an arbitrary way.
(i) The strategy (4.4) is optimal for the convexified problem (2.17).
(ii) We have
(α∗t , q
∗
t ) ∈ domC × domR, C˜(α∗t ) = C(α∗t ), R˜(α∗t ) = R(α∗t ), t ∈ T . (4.6)
(iii) There exist qi ∈ Q, αi ∈ A, i = 1, 2 and γ ∈ (0, 1), ν ∈ (0, 1) such that (3.8),
(3.9) hold true. Replacing (4.5) by the static relaxed control
q(dx) = γδq1(dx) + (1− γ)δq2(dx), α(dx) = νδα1(dx) + (1− ν)δα2(dx), (4.7)
we get the solution of the relaxed problem (2.18).
(iv) If Mζ 6= ∅, then replacing (4.5) by
û ∈ arg max
u∈Q∩A
(R(u)− C(u)), (4.8)
we get an optimal solution of the problem (2.4).
Proof. Since H is differentiable on F and v′ : (0,∞) 7→ (0, ζ) is a bijection, it follows
that H ′(v′(x)) is well-defined on the co-countable set (v′)−1(F ) ⊂ (0,∞). The second
derivative v′′ exists a.e. on (0,∞). By the chain rule (see [11, Corollary 3.48]), from
the HJB equation it follows that
βv′(x) = H ′(v′(x))v′′(x) a.e. on (0,∞). (4.9)
Put q̂(z) = −R̂′(z), α̂(z) = Ĉ ′(z), z ∈ F . Then
H ′(z) = R̂′(z) + Ĉ ′(z) = −q̂(z) + α̂(z) < 0, z ∈ F. (4.10)
Using q̂(v′(x)), α̂(v′(x)) formally as feedback controls, by formulas (4.9), (4.10) we get
dt =
dXt
α̂(v′(Xt)− q̂(v′(Xt)) =
dXt
H ′(v′(Xt))
=
1
β
d(ln v′(Xt)).
Using the initial condition X0 = x, after the integration we get
t =
1
β
ln
v′(Xt)
v′(x)
. (4.11)
The function
y 7→ 1
β
ln
v′(y)
v′(x)
: [0, x] 7→ [0, τ ]
is a bijection. Define the function t 7→ Xt : [0, τ ] 7→ [0, x] by the equation (4.3), which
is identical to (4.11). Since v′′ < 0 a.e., from Lemma 3 it follows that the strictly
decreasing function t 7→ Xt is absolutely continuous.
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Let us proof that the strategy (4.4), (4.5) is optimal for the convexified problem
(2.17). Since v′ is absolutely continuous (see Theorem 1), the function ln v′(y) is also
absolutely continuous on [0, x]. Hence,
ln v′(x)− ln v′(y) =
∫ x
y
d
dz
ln v′(z) dz =
∫ x
y
v′′(z)
v′(z)
dz = β
∫ x
y
dz
H ′(v′(z))
, y ∈ [0, x]
and
1
β
ln
v′(x)
v′(Xt)
= −t = −
∫ x
Xt
dz
H ′(v′(z))
, t ∈ [0, τ ]. (4.12)
From (4.12) by the chain rule [11, Corollary 3.48] we get
X˙t = H
′(v′(Xt)) = α̂(v
′(Xt)− q̂(v′(Xt)) = α∗t − q∗t a.e. on [0, τ ].
Here we used (4.10) and (4.4). For t > τ the relation X˙t = α
∗
t − q∗t = 0 is trivially
satisfied. We conclude that the strategy (α∗, q∗) is admissible, since it induces a non-
negative state process X = Xx,α
∗,q∗.
To prove that (α∗, q∗) is optimal, it is enough to show that the function
W (t) =
∫ t
0
e−βs(R˜(q∗s)− C˜(α∗s)) ds+ e−βtv(Xx,α
∗,q∗
t ) (4.13)
is constant, since then
W (0) = v(x) = lim
t→∞
W (t) =
∫ ∞
0
e−βs(R˜(q∗s)− C˜(α∗s)) ds.
Differentiating (4.13), by (4.4) we get
W˙ = e−βt
(
R˜(q∗t )− C˜(α∗t )− βv(Xx,α
∗,q∗
t ) + v
′(Xx,α
∗,q∗
t )(α
∗
t − q∗t )
)
= e−βt
(
−βv(Xx,α∗,q∗t ) + R̂(v′(Xx,α
∗,q∗
t )) + Ĉ(v
′(Xx,α
∗,q∗
t ))
)
= e−βt
(
−βv(Xx,α∗,q∗t ) +H(v′(Xx,α
∗,q∗
t ))
)
= 0 a.e. on (0, τ).
For t > τ we have Xx,α
∗,q∗
t = 0, α
∗
t = q
∗
t = û and
W (t) =
∫ τ
0
e−βs(R˜(q∗s)− C˜(α∗s)) ds+
1
β
e−βτ (R˜(û)− C˜(û)),
since −e−βt(R˜(û) − C˜(û))/β + e−βtv(0) = 0 by the optimality of û for zero initial
inventory: see Theorem 4.
Since v′(Xt) ∈ F , t ∈ T , by Lemma 6 we infer that the relations (4.6) hold true. It
follows that
v(x) =
∫ τ
0
e−βs(R(q∗s)− C(α∗s)) ds+ e−βτv(0)
since W is constant. From Theorems 5 and 4 it follows that the strategies (4.4), (4.7)
and (4.4), (4.8) (under the condition Mζ 6= ∅) give the same value of the objective
functional as (4.4), (4.5). Hence, they are optimal for the problems (2.18) and (2.4)
respectively. 
18 DMITRY B. ROKHLIN AND GEORGII MIRONENKO
Note, that by (4.10) the state process Xx,α
∗,q∗ , induced by (4.4) is strictly decreasing
on (0, τ). In the case of Mζ = ∅ one can also use an approximately optimal strategy
(3.14), (3.15) on (τ,∞) instead of an optimal relaxed strategy (4.7).
5. The case of strictly concave revenue and linear production cost
Let Q = [0, q], A = [0, α], q, α > 0. Assume that R is differentiable and strictly
concave, and let C = cα, c > 0. An optimal strategy is completely described by the
functions q̂(v′(x)), α̂(v′(x)) and the value û, given in Theorem 6.
We have
H(z) = sup
q∈[0,q]
(R(q)− qz) + sup
α∈[0,α]
(αz − C(α)) = R̂(z) + α(z − c)+, x+ = max{0, x}.
Since MR(z) contains exactly one element q̂(z), the function R̂ is continuously differ-
entiable (see [16, Theorem 25.5]), and q̂(z) = −R̂′(z) is continuous.
If R′(0) ≤ 0, then q̂(z) = 0, z ≥ 0 and ζ = minMH = {0}. From theorem 1 it
follows that v(x) = H(0)/β = 0 and the problem is trivial. Thus, we may assume that
R′(0) > 0.
The calculation of an optimal static strategy (3.1) for zero initial inventory is simple:
{û} = arg max
u∈[0,α∧q]
(R(u)− cu) =

0, R′(0) ≤ c,
(R′)−1(c), R′(0) > c,R′(α ∧ q) < c,
α ∧ q, R′(α ∧ q) ≥ c.
Furthermore, from the formula
H ′(z) =
{
−q̂(z), z ∈ (0, c),
α− q̂(z), z > c (5.1)
it follows that q̂ is non-increasing, since H is convex. Clearly, limz→+∞ q̂(z) = 0 (and
q̂(z) = 0 for sufficiently large z, if R′(0) < +∞). From (5.1) we conclude that
ζ = minMH = inf{z ≥ 0 : q̂(z) = 0} ∧ inf{z ≥ c : q̂(z) ≤ α} > 0.
The function q̂(v′(x)), x ∈ (0,∞) is non-decreasing and
lim
x→0
q̂(v′(x)) = q̂(v′(0)) = q̂(ζ) = û,
lim
x→+∞
q̂(v′(x)) = q̂(0) = arg max
q∈[0,q]
R(q),
by Theorems 1 and 3.
The function α̂(v′(x)), x ∈ (0,∞) is piecewise constant:
α̂(v′(x)) =
{
α, v′(x) > c,
0, v′(x) < c.
In particular, α̂(v′(x)) = 0, x > 0 if ζ = v′(0) < c. Note, that in the opposite
case, where the production price c is lower than the marginal indirect utility of zero
inventory: ζ = v′(0) > c, the production should start when the inventory is reduced
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to the level x̂ > 0, defined by the equation v′(x̂) = c. However, after the production is
switched on, the inventory level still decreases and reaches zero in finite time τ .
From (4.9) it follows that v is twice continuously differentiable on (0, x̂) ∪ (x̂,+∞),
and v′′ = βv′/H ′(v′) on this set. However, v′′ is discontinuous at x̂:
v′′(x̂+ 0) =
βc
H ′(c+)
6= v′′(x̂− 0) = βc
H ′(c−) .
Thus, v′′ can be discontinuous under assumptions of Theorem 1.
6. Arvan-Moses example
In the example of [1] the demand is linear, hence the revenue looks as follows:
R(q) = (A− Bq)q, q ∈ [0, A/B].
The production cost
C(α) = α3/3−Kα2 +K2α, α ≥ 0
is concave on [0, K] and convex on [K,∞). It is assumed that where A,B,K > 0. We
have
R′(q) = A− 2Bq, R′′(q) = −2B,
C ′(α) = (α−K)2, C ′′(α) = 2(α−K).
Note, that the function C is strictly increasing and 1-coercive. The function R is
strictly concave.
Take the largest s such that sα ≤ C(α), α ≥ 0. We have
s = inf
α≥0
{α2/3−Kα +K2} = K
2
4
,
where infimum is attained at α0 = 3K/2. It is easy to see that
C˜(α) = (coC)(α) =
{
K2α/4, α ∈ [0, 3K/2],
C(α), α ≥ 3K/2.
For the convexified problem (2.17) an optimal static strategy for zero initial inventory
is given by
û ∈ arg min
u∈[0,A/B]
(R(u)− C˜(u)).
We have
R′(u)− C˜ ′(u) =
{
A− 2Bu−K2/4, u < 3K/2,
A− 2Bu− (u−K)2, u > 3K/2.
It follows that
û =

0, A ≤ K2/4,
(A−K2/4)/(2B), K2/4 ≤ A ≤ 3BK +K2/4,
−B +K +√B2 − 2BK + A, A ≥ 3BK +K2/4.
(6.1)
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For A ≤ K2/4 and A ≥ 3BK +K2/4 we have C˜(û) = C(û). Hence, in these cases
αt = qt = û is an optimal solution for the original problem (3.3). If
K2
4
< A < 3BK +
K2
4
, (6.2)
then û belongs to the interval (0, 3K/2), where C˜ is linear and C˜ < C. In this case an
optimal relaxed production control is constructed by formulas (3.8) – (3.10):
αt(dx) = νδ0 + (1− ν)δ3K/2, (1− ν)3K
2
= û =
(
A− K
2
4
)
1
2B
. (6.3)
We see that for zero initial inventory an ordinary static strategy is not optimal iff the
condition (6.2) is satisfied. In this case instead of the relaxed strategy (6.3) one can use
an approximately optimal strategy (3.14), (3.15). Under this strategy the inventory
remains close to 0: Xt ≤ bε, b > 0 and demonstrates cyclic accumulation-decumulation
behavior, described in [1]. However, it need not produce discounted profit close to
optimal if accumulation-decumulation cycles are not small. It is also interesting to
note that the condition
K2 < A < 3BK +
K2
4
,
quite similar to (6.2), appeared in [1].
Let z ≥ 0. Denote by α̂, q̂ the maximum points of
zα − C˜(α)→ max
α≥0
, R(q)− zq → max
q∈[0,A/B]
.
We have
α̂(z) =
{
0, z ∈ [0, K2/4),
K +
√
z, z > K2/4,
q̂(z) =
{
(A− z)/(2B), z ∈ [0, A],
0, z ≥ A, (6.4)
and α̂(K2/4) ∈ [0, 3K/2]. Let us find the least mimimum point ζ = minMH of the
Hamiltonian
H(z) = sup
q∈[0,A/B]
{(A− Bq)q − zq} + sup
α≥0
{zα− C˜(α)}
=
(z − A)2
4B
I{z<A} + (zα̂(z)− C(α̂(z)))I{z>K2/4}, z ≥ 0.
If A ≤ K2/4, then ζ = A. Otherwise, consider
H ′(z) =
z −A
2B
+ α̂(z) =
z − A
2B
+K +
√
z, z ∈
(
K2
4
, A
)
.
Since limzրAH
′(z) > 0, it follows that ζ ∈ (K2/4, A) iff
lim
zցK2/4
=
1
2B
(
K2
4
− A+ 3BK
)
< 0
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Under this condition ζ is defined by the equation H ′(ζ) = 0, ζ ∈ (K2/4, A). Otherwise,
ζ = K2/4. Collecting all cases, considered above, we get
ζ =

A, A ≤ K2/4,
K2/4, K2/4 ≤ A ≤ K2/4 + 3BK,(−B +√B2 − 2BK + A)2 , A ≥ K2/4 + 3BK.
Note, that these three cases are the same as in (6.1).
Let us consider the feedback strategies q̂(v′(x)), α̂(v′(x)), defined in Theorem 6.
Since v′(x) ≤ v′(0) = ζ and ζ ≤ A for any set of parameters, we get
q̂(v′(x)) =
A− v′(x)
2B
, x > 0.
Hence, q̂(v′(x)), x > 0 is a strictly increasing positive function. Moreover, it is easy to
see that
lim
xց0
q̂(v′(x)) =
A− ζ
2B
= û.
If A ≤ K2/4 + 3BK, then ζ ≤ K2/4 and
α̂(v′(x)) = 0, x > 0.
If A > K2/4 + 3BK, then v′(0) = ζ > K2/4 and there exists a unique point x̂ > 0
such that v′(x̂) = K2/4. In this case
α̂(v′(x)) =
{
K +
√
v′(x), x < x̂,
0, x > x̂.
Thus, we have three cases. (i) If A ≤ K2/4, then the firm should optimally sell the
initial inventory:
X˙t = −q̂(v′(Xt)) = −A− v
′(Xt)
2B
< 0, Xt > 0.
The production is shut down.
(ii) If K2/4 < A < K2/4 + 3BK, then the production starts after selling the
initial inventory, and the relaxed production strategy (6.3) should meet the demand
q̂(ζ) = û = (A−K2/4)/2B.
(iii) If A ≥ K2/4 + 3BK, then the production starts after the inventory falls below
x̂. The inventory still decreases to 0 and stabilizes at this level. Optimal demand and
production intensities of the related stable regime are equal to û, defined by (6.1).
Finally, to illustrate the result of Theorem 3 we will show that Mη 6= ∅ iff (6.2) is
satisfied. Let ϕ(α, z) = zα− C(α). Considering
∂ϕ
∂α
(α, z) = z − (α−K)2, α > 0,
we infer that ϕ(·, z) has two local maximum points α1 = 0, α2 = K+
√
z for z ∈ (0, K2)
and the global maximum point α2 = K +
√
z for z ≥ K2. Furthermore,
d
dz
ϕ(α2(z), z) = α2(z) + (z − (α2(z)−K)2)α′2(z) = α2(z) > 0, z > 0
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and ϕ(α2(K
2/4), K2/4) = ϕ(3K/2, K2/4) = 0. It follows that
ϕ(α1(z), η) = 0 > ϕ(α2(z), z) iff z < K
2/4
and
MC(z) = argmax
α≥0
(zα− C(α)) =

0, z ∈ [0, K2/4),
{0, 3K/2}, z = K2/4,
K +
√
z, z > K2/4.
Clearly, Mη 6= ∅, η ≥ 0 iff q̂(η) 6∈ MC(η), η ≥ 0, where q̂(η) is defined by (6.4). It is
easy to see that this is the case iff A > K2/4 and
q̂(K2/4) =
A−K2/4
2B
<
3K
2
,
which is the same as the right inequality in (6.2). Thus, Theorem 3 again implies that
there is no optimal ordinary stationary strategy for zero initial inventory iff (6.2) is
satisfied.
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